By Somingam PS & Ramachan A Shimray
(The authors are researchers specialising in Indo-Myanmar studies. This piece is dedicated to the late John Kathing, the headman of Namlee Village)
Kamjong | EKHON: On the morning of May 7, 2026, a coordinated pre-dawn offensive targeted four Naga border villages in Manipur’s Kamjong district, namely, Kashung-Namlee, Wanglee, Choro, and Ashang Khullen (KAKA). Reportedly, hundreds of heavily armed militants from the Kuki National Army – Burma (KNA-B) crossed from Myanmar, subjecting the villages to a three-hour relentless siege involving automated gunfire and drone strikes. As the assault began, defenceless Naga villagers, including women, children, and elders, were forced to flee into the jungles for safety. In the aftermath, ground footage captured reveals widespread destruction across the affected villages. The attackers left behind a ghost town with skeletal remains of more than 30 homes, shops, bikes and vehicles. In some cases, valuable items such as money, bikes, mobile phones, and valuable properties were looted from the deserted homes.
Chief Minister of Manipur, Yumnam Khemchand, issued a strong condemnation and directed security forces to “take all necessary measures to restore peace and prevent any further escalation”. Later, Manipur’s Home Minister, along with his delegation, including Members of the Legislative Assembly (MLAs), bureaucrats and community leaders, visited the affected villages on 9th May, 2026.
Locating the Razed Villages in India’s Mission to Southeast Asia
Situated on the edges of the Kamjong district, the razed Naga villages are located adjacent to the international border pillar 8 (old) and 92 (new) under Kasom Khullen Police station. These villages serve as strategic border gatekeepers, deeply integrated into the cross-border trade relations, besides shared socio-cultural affinities of transborder communities. The composition of these villages resembles a ‘melting pot’, whereby inhabitants are comprised of Tangkhul Nagas and other Naga ethnic groups from Manipur. Re-envisioning these villages as vital Act East Policy corridors, they are connected to multiple towns and cities on both sides of the border. It mirrors the economic potential of the Moreh international trade centre in southern Manipur.
Following the Meitei-Kuki conflict and the subsequent economic paralysis of Moreh, the razed Naga border villages emerged as vital alternative corridors to Manipur and the rest of India, offering a durability in India’s Act East Policy. These villages establish critical links to Myanmar’s key urban centres, including Tamu, Khamti, Mandalay, Homalin, and the regions beyond. It represents a pivotal geo-political asset for India’s engagement with Southeast Asian markets. Recently, the govt. of India, has surveyed the area and has laid the foundation for an Integrated Check Post (IPC) at Ashang Khullen village (‘Kaka trade Centre’) located beside the bank of the Chindwin River that connects to key urban centres in Myanmar. Further, the razed villages have donated sizeable lands for the construction of critical infrastructure, such as the New Development Bank (NDB) water project, bridge, roads, MSPDCL power projects, including prominent institutions, like JNV and others, anchoring the mission of India’s Act East Policy.
These villages are designated as a strategic border trade corridor/centre, long nurtured by the Govt of India, Naga Indigenous villages, and local stakeholders. By attacking vital border corridors, the alleged KNA-B are actively undermining India’s geo-political mission and border security. Disassembling vital International trade corridors will not only pose implications on India’s geopolitical footprint but may also provide a strategic vacuum for ambitiously expanding China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Underscoring these potential ramifications, the Govt of India needs to rethink its approach in prioritising Nagas as one of the primary stakeholders in India’s geopolitical policy landscape.
An Attack on the Inter-ethnic Humanitarian Conduit: A Slit on the Throat
Beyond ethnic ties, relationships between the Vaiphei-Kuki-Chins in Myanmar and the Nagas in India had been cordial over regular trade transactions and daily affairs along the Indo-Myanmar border region. This spirit of co-existence continued following the political crisis in Myanmar, as Naga villages provided humanitarian refuge to thousands of displaced people, many of whom were Vaiphei-Kuki-Chin origin. When the attack occurred, hundreds of displaced Vaiphei-Kuki-Chin members were still taking refuge within the razed villages. In 2024, the Tangkhul Nagas, through the Churches Association (based in Manipur), mobilised aid across the Naga hills for displaced refugees, prioritising universal humanitarian need over ethnic boundaries, despite pressure from some critics to restrict aid to those of Kuki-Chin descent.
It is beyond words that such a premeditated attack was perpetrated against those who clothe, feed, and give shelter to their mothers, children, and people in their troubling times. Thereupon, the official communique issued by the United Naga Council (UNC) alleged that the “children of some refugees had been enrolled into Peoples’ Defence Force (PDF)/KNA(B) structures and were involved in acts of arson in Namlee, Wanglee and Choro”. The organisation insisted that “the present crisis should not be viewed merely as a refugee issue, but as a calculated cross-border invasion of Naga ancestral land”.
The tragic assault on Naga border villages has shattered the long-standing spirit of coexistence that once thrived across international borders and ethnic lines. In a deeply fragile region, when the spirit of mutual humanitarian support serves as the last resort to rebuild hope and mutual trust, the unfortunate ravaging of such a fabric of life raises critical concerns about cross-border coexistence. If not tackled with foresight, it has the potential to reinforce the already conflict-ridden region beyond repair.
Manipur’s Ethno-Political Tension and Cross-Border Nexus
The cross-border foreign aggression in Manipur cannot be viewed in isolation; it is deeply linked to the current ethno-political dynamics of Manipur and the broader regional fallout of the Myanmar crisis across the border, that posed direct implications to the Indigenous people of Manipur. This is particularly allegedly evident in the Kuki’s political project, aggressively wielding its ambition through “demographic engineering” and “unnatural growth of Kuki villages” in Manipur. Of which, the voices of the indigenous communities in Manipur have been in resurgence over the years due to long neglect by the state policymakers. Fear and insecurities heightened, particularly among the Meiteis and Nagas, such that “Kuki Refugees” from Burma/Myanmar are allegedly engendering “socio-political and demographic threats” to the Indigenous people of Manipur. Over the decades, this has resulted in the Kuki-Naga Ethnic Conflict in 1992 and the Kuki-Meitei Ethnic Conflict in 2023.
With such development, there is also growing fear and angst among the Kuki sections, who are indigenous to Manipur. Although the language of “Kuki refugees” has entered into the popular narratives in Manipur, framing the entire Kuki people as “Refugees” requires accountability. At the outset, this ethnic polarisation, that is deeply linked to Myanmar’s geopolitical landscape and its recent crisis, whereby thousands of violence-displaced Kukis from the Chin state of Myanmar have reportedly entered Manipur and Mizoram. The Nagas and Meiteis perceived this as a chief factor where Kukis are covertly advancing their “demographic engineering” in Manipur. This perhaps intensified ethnic tensions and conflicts in the state over the years.
Against this backdrop, the coordinated foreign (Myanmar-based) aggression on Naga border villages occurred amidst the rising tension between the Kukis and Nagas in Ukhrul, Kamjong, and Kangpokpi districts of Manipur that had freshly surfaced in February 2026. The tension revolves around land and territoriality; however, comparatively, in a controlled mode, restraining a full-blown conflict on both sides. Some observed it as the manifestation of the Kuki-Meitei Conflict of 2023, resulting in a demographic divide between Kukis and Meiteis.
Displaced Kuki-chin communities from the Imphal valley were settled into the areas where Nagas have a long-standing legal and ancestral claim. Whereas the Kukis claim it otherwise. Around these claims and counterclaims – attacks and counterattacks, the KNA-B, a Myanmar-based Kuki armed group, chose to ransack the Naga border villages in India, crossing the Indo-Myanmar border.
Is Attack the Nexus of Dual Foreign Interests?
In March 2026, the Hindu reports the arrest of Ukrainian nationals and one American by the National Investigation Agency (NIA) for allegedly entering India illegally and travelling to Myanmar. The suspects were apprehended across various Indian cities, including Delhi, Lucknow, and Kolkata, following a crackdown on foreign involvement in Indian border security issues.
The National Investigation Agency (NIA), the anti-terror agency handling the case, has alleged that the intercepted foreigners trained Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs), including Kuki-armed groups linked to insurgent outfits in India, as well as supplying weapons from Europe, including drones. This has spotlighted the covert entry and activities of foreign nationals to “restricted zones” in the country and their penetration into neighbouring Myanmar.
Conceivably, the gravity of this foreign involvement was underscored less than two (2) months later when KNA-B, the same group reportedly trained by these western nationals, launched a coordinated drone and automated weapons attack on India’s critical geopolitical borderlands in Manipur. The synchronised timing, the underlying motive, and drones and automated warfare on Indian soil demand an immediate strategic rethinking to protect the indigenous Naga communities and the integrity of India’s borders.
Case of “proxy war” on Nagas?: A Call for Accountability on India’s Border Security
Despite Manipur being the most militarised state, New Delhi appeared indifferent to cross-border coordinated strikes on Naga villages along the Indo-Myanmar border areas. This failure to respond to cross-border aggression on Indian soil highlights a troubling gap in India’s security framework intended to protect these indigenous people and the border in the region. Contrasting it with more decisive military operations like “Operation Sindoor” along the Indo-Pakistan border with nationwide media headlines, the cross-border attack on Naga villages remains more of a mystery. Ever since the outbreak of the Myanmar crisis in 2021, India’s security force, i.e., Assam Rifles, had established several temporary outposts and had been regularly conducting military patrols along the Indo-Myanmar border. According to Christopher Finningan’s Security Challenges Along the India-Myanmar Border (2019), there are 46 Assam Rifles battalions deployed along the 1643 borders to safeguard them, with 31 battalions engaged in counter-insurgency and the remaining 15 battalions for border guarding. In such a case, the failure to intervene in a prolonged three-hour attack on Naga villages, despite being stationed in the immediate vicinity of 3-4 kms has sparked outrage among the Naga inhabitants. The delayed Assam Rifles response is perceived as ‘feigning ignorance’, increasingly viewed as evidence of a “proxy war on Nagas” and a collapse in impartial border security. These allegations have been contested and echo accountability concerns raised by Meitei-based civil bodies, since May 3 2023, regarding the pattern of selective protection and biased enforcement of the Assam Rifles in Manipur.
In its logical equation, the prolonged historical relationship among Nagas, Kukis, and India reveals a deeper structure of political contradiction inherited from the British and subsequently sustained under India through the logic of divide-and-rule governance. Nagas have historically articulated political aspirations grounded in recognition, dignity, and self-determination, yet both the British and India treated Nagas as a ‘political other’ to be contained or opposed. Kukis, however, occupied a different position. Rather than being treated as a fully external other, Kukis was repeatedly incorporated into the coercive security structures of governance and mobilised for militarised auxiliary functions against Nagas. Such incorporation, however, did not amount to equal civic recognition. A community repeatedly valued for coercive utility is not treated as an equal political community, but as an instrument for managing another population.
Over nearly two centuries, this prolonged instrumentalisation may have internalised and normalised militarised and “mercenary” -centric behavioural orientations within sections of Kukis through intergenerational trauma, inherited stigma, conditioned dependency, and the normalisation of violence. The manifestation of such historically conditioned behaviour may partly explain why many neighbouring communities in the region continue to experience tension and conflict with Kukis. Psychologically, Kukis themselves may not always be fully conscious of the extent of this dehumanisation because the very structures of thought, duty, and identity may have been deeply colonised through prolonged historical conditioning. The tragedy lies in the fact that these tensions were not inherently produced by the Kukis themselves but emerged through structures first instituted by the British and later perpetuated under India. Consequently, India cannot continue reproducing the same historical injury and injustice. Like Nagas have also suffered, Kukis too have already suffered under the instrumental logic of the British and cannot continue to suffer under India through conditional inclusion and coercive utility. Kukis must, therefore, be recognised as a community of equal citizens possessing full dignity and humanity instead of being repeatedly reduced to instrumental agents within inherited colonial structures of conflict.
Restoring Co-existence as an Asset to India’s Geo-political Strategy
For India to meaningfully exist as India, it must ultimately move beyond the logic of domination and enter the logic of recognition, reciprocity and mutual respect. In this sense, the deeper political requirement is not merely control, but the capacity to love politically, that is, to recognise the humanity, dignity, aspirations, and historical wounds of Nagas and Kukis without reducing them to threats or instruments. If India continues to govern primarily through coercion and suspicion, both Nagas and Kukis may gradually drift away emotionally and politically from India, a fertile site for external intervention. The long-term stability of India, as such, depends not merely upon military continuity but upon whether Nagas and Kukis genuinely experience themselves as equal participants within India. Only then can India meaningfully exist as India, as one political community grounded in mutual dignity, reciprocal recognition, and shared belonging.
Considering this, the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) needs to recalibrate its security lens to a more dynamic strategy that reflects contemporary realities instead of relying on stagnant security approaches. Perceived conventional outlook to the Nagas as the chief regional threat ignores the fact that Naga communities are now vital allies in India’s geo-political Act East Policy. The progress made through official Indo-Naga political dialogue over the years demands a genuine recognition and maximisation of its benefits for both parties, rather than allowing foreign actors to jeopardise border security. India’s strategic considerations must account for the Naga people as an indigenous transborder community whose presence covers nearly 35% of the Indo-Myanmar borderline. Such that, if India failed to engage the Nagas as one of the primary stakeholders in stabilising India’s border security and advancing geo-political footprint, it has the potential to escalate regional instability. Potentially, this could also provide a foothold to ambitiously expanding China’s Belt and Road Initiative in the region and may even risk a return to Naga-Beijing relations. It is imperative to evaluate these potential implications to avoid the risk of becoming a geopolitical liability for India. Similar logic to the counterparts offers a long-term viability to regional stability vis-à-vis augmenting India’s geopolitical leverage.
(The views expressed in the article are solely those of the writer and do not reflect the vision, policy, or editorial position of Ekhon.)
