- By Maj (Retd) Dr. Mayanglambam Amitkumar
Imphal, Manipur | EKHON: On 13 January, a seminar at the City Convention Centre in Imphal brought together security officials, academics, and civil society under the theme “Resurgent Manipur: Framework for Stability & Sustained Growth.” Jointly organised by the Assam Rifles and Manipur University, the event opened with an emotional presentation by Lt Gen C. A. Krishnan. His message was simple and humane: Manipur’s three principal communities must step back from confrontation and rediscover coexistence through give-and-take.
At first hearing, the appeal felt timely and necessary. But a harder question lingered: will this be enough to resolve the underlying issues and secure lasting peace? After months of violence, displacement, and hardened attitudes, reconciliation felt like a lifeline. In the weeks that followed, there were tentative signs it might be possible. Sections of the Thadou community showed openness to dialogue with Meiteis. The restoration of an elected government raised hopes of political normalcy. Outreach by the Chief Minister toward Kuki organisations hinted at a thaw.
Then, on the intervening night of the 7th and 8th of this month, a bomb fired at Tronglaobi by Kuki militants shattered that fragile optimism.
The incident revived an unsettling question: Is the present conflict merely a collapse of inter-community trust after May 2023 — or the visible stage of a much older political aspiration?
A demand older than the present crisis
For many observers, the call for “separate administration” appears to be a reaction to the Meitei–Kuki clashes of May 2023. Historical and evidential threads suggest otherwise.
In 1987, the first Thadou-Kuki feature film Hesohna Phaicham (Valley of Affliction), directed by Lamgin Doungel, portrayed the suffering of hill people under what it framed as a valley-centric administration. Its message was political as much as artistic: the protagonist’s misery could be resolved only through separate administration. Around the same time, songs by Ncy Doungel popularised the evocative phrase “gam leh naam” — land as a metaphor for nationhood.
These cultural expressions emerged not long after Manipur attained full statehood in 1972. Within the next 14 years, the state saw chief ministers from Muslim, Naga, and Meitei communities — reflecting political plurality rather than domination. On the surface, the argument for administrative separation appeared weak. Yet something deeper was taking shape in and around Manipur, shaping imaginations within it.
In 1986, the Lushai Hills of Assam became the state of Mizoram after a historic peace accord. The hills of Manipur remained administratively untouched. Many Kukis felt left out. It was during this period that Kuki-Chin-Mizo ethnonational thought gathered intellectual and organisational momentum. Works such as Zo History by Vumson Suantak and later Zale’n-Gam: The Kuki Nation by P. S. Haokip articulated a broader Zo/Kuki identity that transcended state boundaries.
Alongside this ideological evolution, armed organisations emerged:
* Kuki National Organisation and its armed wing, the Kuki National Army, in 1988 along the Indo-Myanmar border.
* Kuki National Front, formed the same year in Myanmar with a vision of a Kuki homeland.
* Zomi Revolutionary Organisation and its armed wing, the Zomi Revolutionary Army, in 1993 in Kachin State, with stated aims of protecting Zo interests, fostering unity among Kuki-Chin tribes, and seeking territorial contiguity across borders.
Culture, faith, and cross-border ties
Ethnonational consciousness was reinforced through ZoFest gatherings, shared commemorations of figures such as Raja Goukhothang Guite, sports memorials, music tours, and documentaries celebrating Chin-Mizo-Kuki unity. Christian missionary networks across Chin State, Mizoram, and Kuki areas of Manipur, along with diaspora links to Western countries, deepened these bonds.
Over time, this produced not just cultural affinity but a political imagination that looked beyond Manipur’s administrative framework.
Present anxieties: migration, narco-economy, scholarly distortion and control.
The present conflict also intersects with concerns over illegal immigration and demographic shifts along the porous Indo-Myanmar border. Allegations persist that ethnic kinship networks facilitate cross-border movement with political and demographic implications. Similar accusations have surfaced in Mizoram regarding Chakma migration from Bangladesh.
Another dimension is the narco-economy. Poppy cultivation zones often overlap with areas of influence of certain armed groups. While Meitei and Naga insurgent groups historically relied on overt taxation and extortion, the narcotics trade — which has expanded sharply in the past decade — offers a less visible and potentially more lucrative funding source for Kuki-Zo armed groups.
The Suspension of Operations (SoO) agreements with Kuki-Zo armed groups, intended to reduce violence, are also debated. Critics argue that SoO has at times functioned as a shield, limiting the operational reach of Indian security forces while armed groups consolidate influence.
Some contemporary Kuki scholars have increasingly advanced historical claims about early Kuki presence in the region. References to Pooyas mention Kuki chiefs as allies of Nongda Lairen Pakhangba in 33 AD. The Kuki Research Forum’s 2012 expedition along the Indo-Myanmar border proposed that the Haosapi Cave in Chandel district could correspond to the mythological Khul, cited in oral traditions as the place of origin of the Kukis. To some observers, such interpretations appear aimed at reinforcing claims of historical indigeneity.
Peace versus political trajectory
Lt Gen Krishnan’s appeal rests on a humane premise: rebuild trust, reduce hostility, and restore coexistence. At the social level, this is indispensable. Without reconciliation, no policy can succeed.
But if the demand for separate administration is rooted in a four-decade political evolution, reconciliation alone may not address the underlying aspiration. Peace may calm the streets while leaving the political question unresolved.
In such a scenario, instability paradoxically strengthens the argument for separation, while peace weakens it — creating a troubling incentive structure.
The larger question for the state
For policymakers, the challenge is twofold: 1. Restore harmony among communities through dialogue and confidencebuilding.
2. Address structural issues — governance in the hills, border management, narco-trade, SoO frameworks, and a clear constitutional stance on territorial integrity.
Without the second, the first may offer only temporary relief.
A necessary but incomplete prescription
Lt Gen Krishnan’s call for “give and take” is vital to stop bloodshed and reopen channels of trust. But it may not, by itself, resolve what appears to be a deeper, longterm political project.
Manipur’s path to stability may therefore require both reconciliation among its people and clarity from the state about its political future — grounded in historical honesty and sincerity from all communities. Hidden ambitions, if they exist, will continue to generate friction.
Only when all communities move together can the promise of a truly resurgent Manipur be realised.
The author can be reached at amayanglambam09@gmail.com.
(The opinions and views expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy, position, or endorsement of EKHON.)
